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SOME RUMINATIONS ABOUT REMEDIES IN
CONSUMER-CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
CARL FELSENFELD *
I. INTRODUCTION
The draftsmen of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (herein-
after the Credit Code) have thus far directed most of their time and
effort to establishing a permissive pattern within which creditors give
and debtors receive credit. Spokesmen for both sides, as well as
distinguished neutral parties, have carefully described the terms under
which credit may be granted, the rates that may be charged, and many
other elements of the credit transaction. These statutory requirements
will significantly influence the size and scope of the debtor community
and will undoubtedly set the future pattern for consumer-credit
transactions. Thus, these permissive, or authorizing, guidelines of the
Credit Code are clearly its most important aspects.
Underlying much of the thinking of the Credit Code draftsmen is
an assumption that most debtors will honor their debts and most
creditors will obey the law. Remedies follow violation, and, since
violation is really the exception rather than the rule, the pattern of
remedies in existing consumer-credit legislation is haphazard. It is,
therefore, important, though only secondarily so, to consider what
happens when either debtor or creditor violates a statutory provision
or a term of his bargain. In practice, of course, creditor losses re-
sulting from debtor violations are recouped through interest rates,
special charges, and penalties that yield a compensating return from
those who do pay, either on time or late. Thus, those who pay in a sense
subsidize those who do not. Naturally, the higher the basic rate,
the more loss the creditor is generally able to sustain. Higher rates
also enable creditors to reach a wider group of debtors and to extend
credit to more low-quality risks. Unlike many other commodities,
credit has the effect of becoming more expensive the more people it is
designed to reach.
Debtor violations usually cause creditors an ascertainable
money loss. On the other hand, when creditors are in violation, the
economic effect is more difficult to isolate. Remedies for creditor
violations are, therefore, less precise. Penalties are suggested and'
drafted, but they have never reached the level of sophistication that
has resulted in matters related to debtor default.
* A.B., Dartmouth College, 1949; MS., Columbia University, 1950 . LLB , Colum-
bia University, 1954; Member, New York Bar; Member, New York City Bar Associa-
tion; Draftsman, Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code; Assistant to the General
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The object of this article is hardly to cover the entire field of
creditor and debtor remedies. Instead, discussion is restricted to those
civil remedies that apparently were considered most important by the
draftsmen of the first tentative drafts of the Credit Code. Even here
considerable selection has been necessary; the author's personal
interests have been the major guide.
II. SOURCE OF LAW OF REMEDIES
Fitting major new legislation into an existing legal structure is
always a difficult problem.' The Credit Code, which provides a compre-
hensive set of consumer-credit controls, presents a particularly diffi-
cult challenge, since consumer-credit laws are found in a wide variety
of statutes, as well as in case-law doctrines. This is particularly true
of remedies. Imposition of "uniform" remedies, therefore, necessarily
increases the risk of having varying effects in different states due to
the contrasting legal structures within which they will exist. Essentially
then, it is very difficult to say whether a uniform remedy is desirable
until one determines its place within particular systems.
There are several major existing sources of state remedial law.
Part 5 of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, for example,
sets out a detailed series of provisions on a secured creditor's right
to repossess collateral after a default, prepare it for sale, dispose of it,
and hold the debtor liable for any remaining deficiency. Similarly,
Part 5 provides the debtor with remedies should the secured party
violate his obligations. Except in minor respects, the U.C.C., in its
treatment of remedies, makes no distinction between consumer and
business transactions.' In this respect, the U.C.C. meets with this
writer's general approval. If the Credit Code provides additional
uniform remedies, it will obviously benefit from the fact that forty-
nine states have already adopted the U.C.C., 3 because acceptance will
not be hampered by conflicting legislation.
The incidental benefit of uniformity, however, does not exist among
the state civil-practice laws. These laws generally cover the basic
creditor remedies and will be closely related to most Credit Code
provisions in this area. In the civil-practice laws, one may also find
such specialized related matters as rights of assignees, 4
 rights to
.replevy property, 5 and regulations regarding interest.' These statutes
1 See Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961), for a dis-
cussion of the problems that the Uniform Commercial Code presented in Kentucky.
2 See U.C.C. §§ 9-505(1), -507(1).
3 Only Louisiana has not yet adopted the U.C.C.
4 E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 3019(c) (McKinney 1963).
5 E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7101 (McKinney 1963).
E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5003 (McKinney 1963).
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differ widely from state to state, and the existing differences present a
fundamental problem in drafting uniform legislation.
The justification for a specific remedy in any particular situation
is necessarily predicated upon the available alternatives. Thus, one
finds numerous specialized remedies and interrelated statutory pro-
visions and case-law doctrines creating distinct patterns in different
states. To characterize a particular remedy as harsh or unjust in the
abstract may, therefore, lead to unexpected inequities in individual
situations. For instance, a "judgment note" is a device whereby a
debtor confesses judgment to the creditor as part of his routine
promise to pay. The instrument may normally be filed immediately as
a judgment, thereby becoming a lien on the debtor's real estate
which can be foreclosed in the event of his default. Obviously an
extreme type of remedy, the judgment note is disfavored, if not legally
forbidden, in most states. In some states, such as Pennsylvania,
however, it is in general use. Pennsylvania lawyers strongly assert that
to eliminate the judgment note would occasion an abrupt dislocation
of the credit pattern, since garnishments are forbidden in that state.'
The absence of garnishment may make a remedy such as the judgment
note appropriate for proper creditor protection in Pennsylvania, but
perhaps not in other states with different enforcement provisions.
This is the type of difficulty the Credit Code draftsmen must consider
in establishing any uniform law of remedies.
DEBTORS' REMEDIES
A. Existing Approaches
For the purposes of this section, it is assumed that a creditor, in a
consumer-credit transaction, has violated a statutory provision. What
remedies and defenses should then be available to the debtor? The
question presents conceptual difficulties no matter how it is approached.
Should the answer recognize these difficulties, or should it create an
aura of simplicity? The remedial provisions of existing consumer-
credit laws vary from the very brief to the relatively complex. The
former, while creating the appearance of simplicity and clarity,
generally raise problems by virtue of the absence of coverage in certain
areas, and they suffer in an attempt to provide only a few answers to
what is really a series of problems. On the other hand, the more
complex the remedial provision, the more it is necessary to provide
appropriate answers to those problems at the drafting stage rather than
in litigation.
-In an effort to derive from existing consumer-protective legisla-
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 886 (Purdon 1966). See generally Helstad, Consumer-
Credit Legislation: Limitations on Contractual Terms, pp. 529 -31 supra.
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tion a model for a uniform act, one finds, not unexpectedly, a conglom-
eration of laws easing the debtor's financial burden when a creditor has
violated a statute. The typical civil remedy in the small loan laws is
avoidance of the entire debt,' whereas the sales finance laws usually
deprive the violating creditor of all or a part of the finance charge.'
State general usury laws commonly base their penalties upon some
variation of loss of interest: either loss of the interest above the
legal rate," loss of all interest,' or loss of some multiple of interest.'
Within these categories, there are myriad variations. Small loan
laws" and sales finance laws" may limit the voidness penalty to more
serious violations only. Within one state there may be more than one
loan law or sales finance law with different penalties; general usury
laws may also void principal" or part of principal."
B. Outline of Suggested Legislative Provisions
Drafting a model penalties section will not be attempted in this
article, since so much depends on the many and varied legal duties to
which penalties relate. As a statement of principles, however, the
following is submitted, subject to and amplified by the discussions that
follow:
(a) If an unlicensed creditor engages in direct consumer-lending
activities when licensing is required, the penalty shall be avoidance of
the entire obligation.
(b) If an unlicensed creditor purchases validly created sales
finance obligations when licensing is required, (i) he shall be denied
resort to the courts until licensing is accomplished, and (ii) the effect
of the violation on the debt shall be as provided in (c)-(g) below.
(c) For all violations, however caused, the debtor shall be
permitted to recover all provable damages.
(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided, all statutory viola-
tions shall cost the creditor the full amount of the finance charge plus
one-quarter of the original principal balance.
(e) Subsection (d) shall not apply to the creditor who violates
certain technical listed requirements (e.g., type size, mathematical
computation), and who can prove that the violation was due merely to
honest mistake.
8 See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 58A, § 16(b) (1964).
9 See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(2) (McKinney 1962).
to E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2304 (1953).
11 E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 687.04 (1966).
12 E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 16-202 (Supp. 1961).
13 E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:10-21 (1963).
14 E.g., Minn. Stat. § 168.75(6) (1960).
19 E.g., N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 5-511 (McKinney 1964).
16 E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 47-14-10 (1960).
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(f) The creditor shall be permitted to correct all violations
resulting in a potential penalty under subsection (d), except (i) as
against those who actively assert the violation against the creditor,
and (ii) later than fifteen days after some act either against the
creditor (as a noncontested administrative act) or by the creditor (as a
voluntary correction against some debtor) which objectively demon-
strates his knowledge of the violation.
(g) The debtor whose obligation in a consumer-sale transaction
is assigned to a financing agency shall be required to pay the assignee
who takes in good faith, regardless of the debtor's objections to the
goods or services bought, but only where the debtor has specifically
waived his defenses against an assignee and the assignee buttresses
this by a separate notice of assignment to the debtor.
C. Policy Considerations Behind Civil Penalties
A rational civil penalty can be attained only after clear con-
sideration has been given to what that penalty is designed to accom-
plish. In addition, it is essential that any remedy leading to a variation
of the obligation be set out in the statute with maximum clarity.
Although it can be argued that there are some situations which require
a degree of judicial discretion rather than specific penalties," such
an approach is inappropriate to the consumer-credit area, because
commercial decisions are often influenced by the nature of contingent
sanctions. Due to the inherent complexity of consumer-credit statutes,
a lawyer's advice to his client is more of ten in the nature of a value
judgment than a reading of well-defined rules. For the financer to
steer a completely conservative course can, in a very real sense, often
mean financial ruin. The exercise of judgment, however, includes
evaluation of risk, and cannot be made intelligently without a reference
to sanctions. Poorly defined civil penalties impede balanced decision-
making, and may injure the community by inducing financers to avoid
areas of uncertain risk.
The draftsmen of the Credit Code, in evaluating methods of
penalizing violating creditors, considered many approaches. A pre-
ference, however, was shown for a statutory provision which would
penalize such creditors a multiple of the amount of the excess finance
charge imposed on the debtor. Allowing recovery of only the excess
charge itself was deemed an insufficient deterrent; voidability was
tentatively disapproved as too severe. In evaluating this approach,
several policy factors should be considered.
1. Compensation and Deterrence. Certainly no one will deny
that when a creditor violates the law, he should recompense the debtor
IT General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal. 2d 101, 110, 351 P.2d 768, 773
(1960).
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for actual injury. Typically, however, the consumer's monetary losses
(e.g., unlawful charges by a consumer lender, insufficient refunds
upon prepayment, improper "service" charges or the like) are minimal.
Other violations, such a misstatements of rate or other charges, im-
proper contract disclosures, false advertising, or insufficient record-
keeping create a financial loss that is conjectural at best.
Probably the most important function of consumer-credit-law
penalties is to admonish creditors not to commit the wrong." De-
terrence is necessary since the relatively low amount of excess charge
is often not worth the cost of a legal action. Thus, creditors, over
the long run, can gain an undeserved, unlawful windfall. Sometimes
compensatory damages will serve this preventive function." Where a
lender has overcharged, for example, and the law requires him to
return the overcharge only, no deterrent function is served. The
lender derived gain from the illegal act, but the compensatory remedy
only returns him to where he should have been. Where, however, the
lender obtains no clearly recognizable financial advantage in per-
petrating the wrong (as in utilizing illegal contract forms, assuming
for the moment that no competitive advantage is gained from the
violation), compensatory damages for the debtor's loss do tend to act
as a deterrent. Since actual loss for such violations will normally be
small and difficult to prove in individual consumer-credit transactions,
however, even the latter class of compensatory remedies will be an
inadequate preventive device. Something more must be added for
practical effectiveness. The quantity and quality of the additive is the
principal and most difficult problem.
An acceptable penalty should, at the very least, provide the
debtor sufficient incentive to bring an action or pursue a defense
based upon an alleged violation. Worthy of consideration here, al-
though not traditionally a part of American jurisprudence, is the award-
ing of attorney's fees and court costs to a debtor who sustains a
charge that a creditor has violated the staute. 2° However, in view of
the generally minor actual damages suffered by an individual debtor,
such a provision, without some degree of punitive damages, would
probably inure to the sole benefit of attorneys and, while of possible
deterrent value, would therefore be of advantage to a class not in-
tended as the primary beneficiaries of the statute.
The practice of penalizing the violating creditor by charging
him a multiple of the full or excess charge is familiar to state usury
ts The theory here follows that in tort claims. See Note, Exemplary Damages in
the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 522 (1957).
le See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1931).
so Mich. Laws 1966, Pub. Act. 326 added attorney's fees and court costs to the usury
penalty of loss of interest.
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laws, where the most common penalty is double the full legal in-
terest." The treble-damages penalty found in many trade-regulation
statutes presents a worthy analogy. 22 It is questionable, however,
whether a remedy based on an actual-damages factor will have a
significant deterrent effect in consumer-loan legislation. The following
examples illustrate the use of a "multiple-of-charges" penalty:
(1) The purchase of a new car in New York for $3,000, payable
monthly over a three-year period at the maximum rate of seven per
cent add-on, would cost the buyer $630 in gross finance charges."
Five times the charge would result in a creditor penalty of $3,150, and
almost void the $3,630 contract. Three times the charge would
result in a creditor penalty of $1,890, limiting his recovery to $1,740
of his $3,000 disbursement.
(2) A small loan in New York in the statutory maximum
amount of $800 for two years, payable monthly at the maximum
statutory rate, would cost the borrower $166.48 in interest." A
multiple of five would again almost void the contract, resulting in a
reduction of about $830 from the total debt of $966.48. Three times
the charge is about $500, allowing the creditor to recover about
$300 of his $800 outlay.
Obviously, any penalty based on a multiple of charge loses
appeal to the complaining debtor as the charge diminishes. Although
twice the charge may be substantial enough in a $3,000 credit, it
might not be in an $800 loan. A similar consideration applies to multi-
ples of excess charge. The latter, of course, has the virtue of auto-
matically increasing in severity as the excess increases. Its cogency,
however, is questionable in consumer-credit transactions, where viola-
tions by a licensed lender tend to result in only minor overcharges and
are likely to be in areas other than that of rate. The obvious flaw of a
penalty based solely on overcharge is that the violation need not
necessarily result in an overcharge.
In the numerous transactions involving merely two or three
hundred dollars, or the typical revolving-credit transactions involving
very small balances with only slight charges, something approaching
a voidness penalty should be considered in order to accomplish the
deterrent effect. A penalty in a flat dollar amount, or a combination of
such an amount plus charge or a multiple of charge, might also be
tailored to achieve the desired result. The suggestion previously made
21 E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 16-203 (Supp. 1961) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 47-
126 (1947) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 267 (1966).
22 See Clayton Antitrust Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
23 See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 3030) (a) (McKinney 1962).
24 See N.Y. Banking Law § 352 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
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that one-quarter of principal be forfeited as the basic civil sanction is
presented only as one of many possible compromise figures.
2. Administrative Supervision. Civil penalties applicable to
licensed creditors will reflect the degree to which the legislature wishes
the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the credit adminis-
trators. A serious civil penalty in addition to the supervisory pattern
would encourage the general debtor public and counsel to seek re-
course in the courts. It is questionable whether this practice would
be desirable.
The act of licensing generally indicates the creditor's willingness
to comply with the law.' Continuous supervision over licensed
activities by administrative officials has in practice demonstrated a
conscientiousness and expertise that has further induced the creditor
community to comply with the statute. In addition, violations by
licensed creditors tend to be detected and remedied more quickly and
at considerably less cost at the administrative level than in traditional
law suits.' While the courts must retain their jurisdiction to correct
abuses as well as to provide appeal and redress from improper adminis-
trative action, it is submitted that in licensed activities, the adminis-
trators should be the first line of protection. This can be so only if the
public can secure adequate recovery at the administrative level.
3. Adjustment of Penalty to Violation. Penal sanctions are
usually not adjusted as well in the civil law as in the criminal law."
In general, a statutory violation per se—whether major or minor—
supports a stated civil penalty. Where penalties are based upon actual
damages or multiples thereof, as in the fair-trade laws, there is a
built-in scale. Where, however, penalties are unrelated to actual
damages, the penalty may bear no particular relationship to the
nature of the wrong. The outstanding example in the consumer-finance
field is the voidness penalty of the small loan laws; here minor or
technical errors lead to the same penalties as flagrant violations.
As the complexity of the laws and the number of possible viola-
tions increase, there is an increasing need to make penalties commen-
surate with the wrong committed. Failure to meet the licensing re-
quirement is probably the most significant violation of a regulatory
statute. Yet here, too, there may be extenuating circumstances justify-
ing mitigation of the penalty for infraction. For instance, it is entirely
possible that a lender will neglect to acquire a license due to a good-
faith belief that the nature or legal situs of his transactions does not re-
25 See Note, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 854, 883-84 (1958). See also Comment, Policing
Contracts Under the Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 146 (1950).
26 Cf. Tomlin, Private Recovery Under the Robinson-Patman Act—An Analysis
and a Suggestion, 43 Texas L. Rev. 168, 173 (1964).
27 See Kirk, Use of Statistics in Criminalistics, 55 J. Crim. L., C.IXP.S. 514 (1964).
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quire licensing.28 It is also possible for an unlicensed creditor to impose
charges well within the statutory maximum and cause the debtor no
actual damage.
Violations of maximum-charge provisions are also potentially
serious—but only potentially. A lender may, for example, charge only
minor excess amounts by computing the charge on a 360- instead of
a 365-day year. Or he may in good faith impose an investigation or
appraisal charge upon a borrower, only to be met later by a judicial
finding that the charge was "interest." Even improper recordkeeping
can be more serious than overcharging if the degree of the former is
flagrant and the latter minor. It is impossible, however, to determine,
as a general rule, which violations are serious and which minor.
Nevertheless, the practicalities of the situation and the experience of
the industry do indicate that certain derelictions should be considered
more serious than others.'
4. Punitive Damages. Damages beyond the compensatory level
have been criticized because private parties thus derive "unjust"
enrichment from sanctions whose basic function is to protect the
public interest." In a sense, of course, the charge is justified. It is
also true, however, that in such a situation the plaintiff himself is
performing a public function, and encouragement in the form of
financial reward is necessary to induce him to do so. The purpose in
designating a penalty which is commensurate with the violation is not
to prevent the unjust enrichment of successful litigants, but rather
to stimulate debtors to take action in appropriate circumstances
without subordinating public benefit to private gain.
In addition to the element of private reward, punitive damages
are also open to the objection that they subject a defendant to the
severities of the criminal law without its protections: 3 ' Civil judgments
are supported only by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by
proof going beyond a reasonable doubt as required in criminal trials;
basic elements of most crimes, such as evil intent, are sometimes not
required; and the defendant, if found civilly liable, may also be
criminally prosecuted and thus subject to a kind of double jeopardy.
The objections involving weight of evidence or elements of intent
may be formally correct, but the traditional criminal-law safeguards
are probably not required in the imposition of consumer-protection
penalties. These are not the kind of sanctions involving imprison-
28 See People v. Fairfax Family Fund, Inc., 235 Cal. App. 2d 881, 47 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1964).
22 Consideration might well be given to classifications of penalties which vary in
degree depending upon the type of wrong committed.
32 A rough analogy would be a complaining party in a criminal case pocketing
the fine.
31 See Prosser, Torts 2 (3d ed. 1964).
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ment, permanent disgrace, or the like, against which one is so care-
fully protected by the criminal law. Instead, they mainly involve
money judgments against financial institutions. The problem does,
however, again emphasize the need to place penalties at a rational
level. The deterrent effect should be achieved without simultaneously
reducing the defendant to quasi-criminal status.
The double-jeopardy argument is of more theoretical than actual
interest. For one thing, traditional criminal penalties in the consumer-
credit area are so different from civil penalties that there is little
likelihood of double anything. Fines tend to be insignificant when
compared to the potential dollar loss a large financer faces when credit
transactions involving millions of dollars may be subject to civil
penalties. Imprisonment is, of course, possible, but this need not be
evaluated as a "doubling" of a civil dollar penalty. Finally, experience
has proven that there is little risk of this kind of double jeopardy in
the consumer-credit field. Licensed creditors' violations of credit-
regulatory legislation tend to be slight and technical—usually not
enough to interest the state prosecutor's office. Unlicensed creditors
are also rarely exposed to "double jeopardy." Some, in good faith,
do not believe they require licensing and generally will not interest the
public prosecutor; others are criminals who will usually avoid the civil
courts.
D. Discussion of Suggested Legislative Provisions
1. The Voidness Penalty. As noted, the traditional civil weapon
of the small loan laws, and an occasional penalty in other consumer-
protection statutes, is avoidance of the entire transaction. Essentially,
the court accords a cash gift to the borrower and a free automobile to
the person who buys on a time plan. This extremely harsh remedy
developed in the early period of small loan legislation when only the
most severe sanction was considered adequate to protect the public
against the evils of illegal lending. It was believed that any lesser
penalty, such as loss of interest, would not sufficiently deter loan sharks
from the proscribed activities. In addition, small loan companies were,
some fifty years ago, virtually the only source of consumer loans.'
Only a voidness penalty was deemed effective to control their "monop-
olistic" power. This penalty has remained in the small loan laws more
from tradition than from basic considerations of policy, and a difficult
political problem would face anyone who proposed to eliminate it.
In analyzing the voidness penalty, a distinction must be made
between licensed and unlicensed lenders. Where a statute requires
licensing and provides for continuous state administrative supervision
n The appearance of credit unions and the widespread entry of banks into this
field were later phenomena.
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over the licensed activities, experience has proven that (1) by ob-
taining a license, a lender indicates a recognition of state law and an
inclination to comply with it, and (2) active administrative supervision
is clearly the fastest and most effective way to discover and cure viola-
tions of law. The most serious risk to the public exists where
creditors who do not choose to obtain a license engage in consumer-
credit transactions. These are the individuals, operating in direct
contact with consumers and in violation of the primary state require-
ment, who should be subject to a voidness penalty. This severe penalty
would serve as a deterrent to a most serious violation, and should be
acceptable to both the judiciary and the public.
At this point a caveat is in order. The exact status of consumer-
creditor licensing under the proposed Credit Code is far from settled,
and it is not improbable that a system will be established within which
licensing in the traditional sense will be eliminated. Naturally, any
such result will necessitate certain changes in the analysis contained
in this article. It is, however, probable that any form of mass con-
sumer lending will, whatever the licensing system, be subject to some
form of regular administrative supervision and some form of formal
authority to lend. It is the subjection to administrative supervision, not
the act of licensing alone, that is the essence of the approach taken
herein. With that in mind, the concepts expressed in this article would
still be applicable even if formal "licensing" were eliminated in the
final draft of the Credit Code.
State administrators have considerable power over licensed
creditors: they are constantly examining offices; they have wide
latitude in promulgating regulations; and they can usually suspend
licenses eo instanti. Although conclusive statistics are not available,
there is good reason to believe that they rarely enforce the voidness
penalty as written, although legally they could do so. Instead, when
administrators discover violations, they simply tell the creditors to
correct their procedures and, if appropriate, to make refunds. Creditors
normally comply, because, in fact, the overwhelming number of
"violations" are due to human error or differing, good-faith inter-
pretations of complex statutory provisions. Furthermore, unless the
matter is of some import and the administrator is believed to be clearly
in error, it is generally more politic for the creditor to do as he is
directed. Cases do exist where technical violations have caused entire
debts to be voided," but such results offend principles of fundamental
justice. It is likely that the problem with this penalty exists because the
statutes adopt avoidance as the sole remedy, providing no clear sub-
33 New Finance Ltd. v. Ellis No 11024, Cir. Ct., Jefferson County, Ala., June 24,
1966, is a recent lower-court case which voided loan contracts for inclusion of attorney's
fees and court costs upon the debtor's default.
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stitute for it. Consumer-credit legislation should, therefore, restrict
this penalty to the area of its need, and provide a sensible and practic-
able substitute elsewhere.
2. Right to Correct Violations. A few statutes impose "penalties"
(i.e., damages beyond a compensatory measure) upon creditors for
willful or deliberate violations only." Most penalize for all violations,
including those which result from honest mistake. In certain circum-
stances, however, consumer-credit legislation should allow a creditor or
his assignee to correct violations without incurring a penalty.' There
seems to be little deterrent value, for example, in "penalizing" for an
honest error, unless one feels that the possibility of penalty reduces
the likelihood of error. Furthermore, certain specific technical mis-
takes should not lead to a penalty. The creditor should be held re-
sponsible for what he has done except in the minor areas where mis-
take is permitted."
The policies favoring compensation and deterrence can still be
fulfilled within the context of correction allowance. The former policy
is satisfied by a correction provision requiring a return of the excess
charge or reimbursement for loss. Implementation of the latter policy,
however, creates greater difficulty.
An unrestricted right to correct will have the effect of reducing
the deterrent aspect of a penalty, thereby encouraging risk-taking.
Similarly, the incentive of the wronged party to seek redress will be
reduced if a creditor can simply correct any transaction any time it is
challenged. The following approach is submitted as a workable com-
promise:
(a) As against the complaining party, the creditor should have no
right to correct without incurring a penalty, no matter how innocent his
violation. Such a restriction is deemed necessary to provide the
debtor with incentive to make a formal objection. This objection might
take the form of a complaint to the creditor or the institution of a
legal action. A penalty should not be imposed, however, in a class
action if the creditor would be precluded from correcting as against all
debtors similarly situated. The restriction either should not be applied
to a class action or should be limited to the lead party.
(b) As to all uncomplaining parties, the creditor should have
an unrestricted right to correct voluntarily. In other words, if the
creditor himself discovers a violation, he should be able to correct it
34 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.9 (West Supp. 1966).
Sri
	 statutes do so provide. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4349 (Supp.
1964).
36 It should be perfectly clear that the creditor is responsible for his or his lawyer's
interpretation of the law. See River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1966) for the proposition that an attorney's opinion does not prevent an over-
charge from being deemed deliberate.
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by returning any excess charge and reimbursing for other damages
without incurring an additional penalty. If a debtor discovers the
violation and informs the creditor of it, the right to correct should
exist against all but him. As against those who do not complain, how-
ever, there should be some incentive to encourage a creditor to
correct a violation of which he has actual knowledge. This could be
accomplished by terminating the right fifteen days after the creditor
has learned of a violation through some objectively ascertainable event
(e.g., an adverse judgment, an administrator's uncontested advice
that a violation has occurred, or a voluntary correction with any
particular debtor).
The above limitations on a creditor's right to correct suggest
that undue risk-taking may be encouraged, because, if the creditor's
judgment is wrong, he can merely correct (as against all but the com-
plaining party) and be safe. However, in those states where an un-
restricted right to correct does exist,' there has been no particular
evidence that financers are willing to incur greater risks. Administrative
control and attendant risk of loss of license, as well as general public
attention to lenders and other financers, have been more than sufficient
to prevent extreme risk-taking.
3. Rights of Assignees. When the consumer-credit transaction is
a direct loan, there are normally only two parties involved—a lender
and a borrower. When the initiating transaction is a sale of goods or
services, however, one must of ten consider the rights and liabilities of a
third party—the assignee of the buyer's obligation. It is, of course,
typical of a seller to finance his sales by selling (or pledging) to a
bank or finance company his deferred-payment obligations." If the
retail seller has violated a provision of the protective statute, and the
assignee acquires the obligation without knowledge of the violation, to
what degree should civil penalties be imposed against the latter?
Although the problem is perfectly apparent, it has rarely been
directly confronted. Existing sales financing acts provide little
guidance. A provision such as that in the California act, stipulating
that a good-faith assignee will not be penalized if he corrects the viola-
tion," is rare. Most of the statutes indicate either that a penalty will
be imposed against the violating party only, or that an obligation in
which a violation exists will be unenforceable by assignor or assignee
37 E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 520.39(4) (1962).
38 See Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 Yale
L.J. 839 (1959). The financer's contacts with the retail sale may vary from none what-
ever to intimate involvement. See Frankfurt Fin. Corp. v. Cox, 142 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940). He may supply forms, rate charts, and instructions. He may check
the credit of the retail buyer. Since many retail sellers deal with more than one financer,
he may, after the sale has been completed, be requested to purchase the retail "paper."
38 Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.7 (West Supp. 1966).
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in whole or in part. 4° Financers have assumed, except where it is
perfectly clear otherwise, that they will bear some responsibility for
violations committed by their assignors. Administrative officials have
generally agreed.
Evaluating this position under the "compensatory-deterrent" tests,
it is clear that the assignee must pay for the violations of his assignor.
The compensatory result is the more apparent. By hypothesis, both
the buyer and the financer are innocent. Since a loss must be suffered,
and since the statute exists to protect the consumer from paying more
than the law authorizes, the proper result is to compensate the buyer
whether the loss falls on the financer or on the seller. Furthermore,
the assignee, who may also have benefited from the illegal bargain, is
usually the financially stronger party. Of course, the retail buyer is
not deprived of his redress against the seller. Essentially, he may seek
and gain recourse against seller or assignee. However, since the buyer
is in regular contact with the assignee—the one most likely to initiate
an action on the debt—the issue of legality will probably arise more
often against the assignee than the seller. Protecting the good-faith
assignee from suit would lead to an undesirable result: an action on
the debt might be initiated by the assignee against the buyer, with the
buyer simultaneously suing the seller for a violation of the statute.
The deterrence issue presents a more troublesome question:
Should the assignee be held for more than merely compensatory dam-
ages without regard to his knowledge of the type of violation involved?
This, too, requires an affirmative answer. To hold otherwise would
necessarily create difficult problems of proof as to whether or not the
assignee acted "in good faith," whether he had actual notice of viola-
tion, whether he had knowledge of facts that should have put him on
notice, and so forth. More significantly, it is indisputable that com-
mercial financers are intimately involved with retail sales, even though
divorced from the initiating consumer transactions. Information
regarding forms, procedures, and charges is either supplied by potential
assignees or arranged between sellers and assignees jointly. A course
of "retail" financing with the same seller and financer(s) normally
extends over a period of years. One is forced to conclude, therefore,
that a threat to even an innocent financer must stimulate the exercise
of greater care at the seller level.'
The unlicensed assignee of consumer-credit obligations presents a
somewhat different problem from that posed by the unlicensed direct
lender. Although a voidness penalty is not inappropriate for the
40 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, 29 (Supp. 1966).
41 There is no attempt here to solve the problems of correction which arise. See Cal.
Civ. Code §§ 1812.8, 2984 (West Supp. 1966) (requirement that the debtor receive a copy
of the corrected contract).
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latter,' this penalty should not be imposed upon the former. The
purpose of the statute is to protect the consumer, and since it is the
assignor (usually a seller of goods or services) who deals with the
public, it is logical and necessary to subject him to stringent require-
ments. On the other hand, failure by the assignee to license may or
may not be a direct danger to the consumer or to society. This, of
course, would depend on such factors as the assignee's reasons for not
licensing, his role in the initiating transaction, and his ability to comply
with the prerequisites to licensing. One suggestion is to forbid the
assignee to bring an action to enforce an obligation against a debtor
until he has licensed. This would, in effect, create a quasi-voidness
penalty when the assignee's conduct or structure makes him ineligible
to license. Where, however, circumstances permit the assignee to
license, and he does in fact license, he should be permitted to enforce
an otherwise valid obligation created by another.
4. The "Waiver-of-Defense" Clause. In a time-sale transaction,
the seller of goods or services who is in need of cash instead of the
buyer's obligation normally sells that obligation to a financing agency.
The agency, typically either a bank or a finance company, pays the
seller a cash sum that approximates what he would have received had
he made a cash instead of a time sale. The difference between this sum
and the total received by the financer from the retail buyer is the
financer's profit. The buyer is usually informed of the assignment of
his obligation and pays the financer directly.
The foregoing, only a schematic diagram since the seller-buyer-
financer arrangement is financially more complex, indicates that the
financer is used purely as a source of money. He has made it possible
for a seller and a buyer, with insufficient cash resources, to transact
business. Obviously, the only object of the financer is to recoup his
investment and make his profit. He does not care whether the car is
running smoothly, whether the sofa has faded, or whether the
dance instructor has insulted the young student. He would prefer,
therefore, to avoid the effects of the basic doctrine that an assignee of
a contract acquires it subject to the buyer's defenses against the
assignor." In a retail time sale, this avoidance is commonly accom-
plished by a term in the buyer's contract that any defense he might
have relieving him of his duty to pay the seller shall remain an issue
solely between themselves; he shall pay any assignee of the obligation
in accordance with the schedule terms, without regard to nonfinancial
issues. This is the "waiver-of-defense" clause.
The merits of this clause have been hotly disputed for decades."
42 See p. 544 supra.
43 Associates Loan Co. v. Walker, 76 N.M. 520, 416 P.2d 529 (1966).
44 See Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958).
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The Uniform Commercial Code permits the clause in consumer-credit
transactions unless the statutory or case law of the state forbids it."
Most retail installment sales laws permit it, either expressly or by
failing to forbid it. Some require an assignee to notify the retail buyer
of its existence after he buys the obligation." The buyer is then given
a period of time within which he may assert defenses against the
assignee, after which he is precluded from doing so.
The clause has been criticized for the following reasons:
(a) The retail buyer rarely reads the contract. When he does, he
still cannot be expected to understand the waiver-of-defense clause,
usually written in the fine technical jargon of the finance-company
lawyer. All that the ordinary buyer usually cares about is that he
has bought something, and, if it is defective, that he should not have
to pay for it."
(b) The clause is of little benefit to financers, since the typical
assignment is accompanied by a seller's warranty that the retail
buyer received what he bought and has no defense, set-off, or the like
to his duty to pay. If such a defense is available, the financer may
reassign the obligation to the original seller because of the breach of
warranty, thereby placing the seller and buyer in the positions the
buyer expected, with the buyer able to withhold payment.
(c) An adjunct to point (b) is that it is only the poor, weak, or
dishonest sellers who cannot or will not honor their warranties. There-
fore, where the waiver-of-defense clause matters most is in transactions
affecting the poorer members of the community. The indigent consumer
in this situation has not received a satisfactory product, but his claims
against the seller are futile, and he has no defense when the finance
company presses for the money. In other words, those most needy of
protection are those who suffer the most under the clause.
(d) The only real protection a consumer has against improper
sales is his power to withhold payment. A waiver-of-defense clause
effectively precludes this.
(e) As between two presumably innocent parties, the financer
rather than the consumer should bear the loss if the seller fails to
satisfy the consumer. The financer is usually involved with the seller
under some continuing arrangement, is often aware of the seller's
general behavior and type of operation, and has some power to correct
abuses. Also, the financer is in a better position to afford the loss.
(f) If the seller's responsibilities become those of the assignee,
sales financers would tend to offer their services to only the stronger
45 U.C.C. § 9-206.
46 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.2 (West Supp. 1966).
44 See Cramatan Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Moody, 326 Mass. 367, 94 N.E.2d 771
(1950).
550
REMEDIES
sellers. Credit might, therefore, tend to disappear for the more marginal
sellers who are equally, if not more, in need of financing.
The waiver-of-defense clause has also been vigorously defended:
(a) The financer is only a source of credit. The economic effect
of a "sales-finance" transaction is the same as if the buyer financed
his purchase through a bank or a loan company. Certainly the fact
that a commodity is defective should not vary the terms of a loan debt
simply because the loan proceeds went to buy it. In fact, the
difference between a direct loan for the purpose of making a purchase
and an assignment of a retail sale obligation to a financer is often
more a matter of form than substance: even the latter financer often
has some form of contact, if not actual agreement, with the retail
buyer before the sale is made. Furthermore, the two types of trans-
action are often given identical legal treatment's
(b) The warranties of seller and manufacturer are usually
sufficient to protect the retail buyer. Therefore, there is no need to
involve the financer in such matters.
(c) Eliminating the waiver-of-defense clause would cut off the
sources of credit which depend upon its existence.
(d) Objection (f) above may also be an argument in defense
of the clause. Withholding credit from marginal sellers may be a
social good; needy buyers who would otherwise go to such a retail
outlet would be diverted to more responsible sellers who are able to
stand behind their warranties.
(e) If the waiver-of-defense clause were eliminated, the ultimate
result might be to force financing agencies to change the form of the
credit transaction from a purchase of a time-sale account to a direct
loan to the buyer (where they would have no concern with the goods
sold). The potency of this argument depends, of course, upon the
statutory requirements (licensing, etc.) imposed on lenders.
(f) Under the doctrine of freedom of contract, there is no
right to preclude the parties from agreeing to a waiver-of-defense
clause.
In this writer's opinion, the significance of the waiver-of-defense
clause has been overemphasized in consumer sales. In actual practice,
there have been no obvious differences in the availability of financing
or the profits of sellers or financers among those states—the clear
majority—that recognize it, those that forbid it, and those in an
intermediate position, if indeed any differences do exist. When one
discusses the problem with representatives of the financing community,
one hears of the disturbing effects that will result from a removal of the
48 See, e.g., Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga. App. 352, 83 S.E.2d 76
(1954).
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clause. One can only suggest that in practice this has not happened;
the reasons are probably a combination of the factors discussed above
as arguments against the clause. Most sales of goods and services
probably do satisfy the buyer, at least to the extent that he accepts the
duty to pay for them; most deficiencies are cured by responsible sellers
or by manufacturers' warranties; and most of the remaining problems
are resolved, insofar as the financer is concerned, by the seller honoring
his warranty to the financer and "repurchasing" the obligation:11'
California law may provide a reasonable compromise.'" There,
the waiver-of-defense clause is effective in a consumer-credit sale only
if the assignee gives the retail buyer separate notice of its existence
after the obligation is assigned. This reduces, to some degree, the
status of the buyer as someone who is bound by a contractual pro-
vision of which he has no knowledge. Under this statute, the buyer, to
preserve his defenses against the assignee, must determine his satisfac-
tion with the transaction and report any objections to the assignee
within a specified period of time."
A significant objection to this approach is that defects in goods
may be discovered after the time period elapses. A new furnace, for
example, purchased in the summer may not be properly tested for
several months. For services, such as dance lessons, that are rendered
over a long period, a time limit for objecting is even less helpful. A
statutory provision excepting defects that, by the nature of the sale or
related circumstances, are not reasonably discoverable within the
prescribed time period, has existing precedent,' and would probably
not encumber the judicial system.
Despite whatever legal alliance exists between the seller and his
assignee, one should not lose sight of the latter as principally a supplier
of money. Certain claims related to the goods sold are sufficiently
removed from the assignee's function, and, therefore, should not be his
responsibility. Probably most important are product-liability claims.
Independent causes of action in this area should be assertable against
the seller only (or prior parties in his chain of title), and not against
the supplier of funds. In addition, the issue of the buyer's right to a
return of payments made after he has discovered an objection to the
sale presents difficulty. To require a finance company-assignee to
return previous payments creates contingent liabilities, and puts a
level of responsibility upon the financer that tends to be dispropor-
49 Typically, a retail seller warrants to his assignee that the sale transaction com-
plies with the law. Any recovery by the buyer against the assignee on this basis will
thus generally give the assignee a cause of action against his assignor.
50 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.2 (West Supp. 1966).
51 Ibid.
52 See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
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tionate to his place in the transaction. At most, the buyer should only
have the right to suspend future payments, and not the right to recover
what he previously had paid during, presumably, a period of satisfac-
tion.
5. Modifications of Unconscionable Contracts. So far it has
been assumed that a creditor has violated a provision of a statute, for
which the appropriate debtor remedy has been sought. This has pre-
supposed the existence of an objective standard by which creditor
performance is measurable, although it has been noted that even so-
called objective standards may, by their very complexity, affect the
remedies problem. The question now considered is whether a standard
beyond "objective" statutory strictures should be imposed.
The preliminary position of the draftsmen of the Credit Code
seems to be that a "conscionability" standard for consumer-credit
transactions is appropriate beyond the formalized Code standards.
The result would be to present a test, in addition to the specific
statutory requirements (the "objectively ascertainable" require-
ments), which will permit the courts to require a higher level of
creditor compliance. When finally drafted, the provision as now con-
ceived is likely to require that a consumer-credit transaction or the
conduct of the creditor be "fair," "conscionable," "equitable," or
"reasonable."
One is reminded, of course, of Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which similarly imposes a conscionability require-
ment on all sales of , goods. That section has been criticized for pre-
scribing vague and unascertainable standards and for substituting the
views of the judiciary for the decisions of the parties to the contract.'
It has been defended on the ground that it is better to have a properly
expressed, equitable basis for decisions that the courts customarily
reach by the use of artificial legalisms rather than clear direction." In
effect, however, section 2-302 has not created a flood of litigation;
nor does it seem to have substituted the desires of the judiciary for
those of the contracting parties.' Actually, the occurrence of such a
substitution would not present a compelling argument against a
conscionability test." The judiciary has its methods of reaching what
53 King, Suggested Changes in the Uniform Commercial Code—Sales, 33 Ore. L.
Rev. 113 (1954).
54 See Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 365 (1960).
55 Unconscionability in consumer-credit transactions is an important consideration
in "contracts of adhesion." Under such contracts, creditors supply and debtors exe-
cute forms that are generally not read by the debtor and, if read, would not be under-
stood. Probably the only elements of such contracts actually "agreed to" by debtor
and creditor are those that are specifically inserted in the blanks of the form as part of
the transaction and those that basically support the insertions. Id. at 362-63.
58 See Comment, 70 Yale L.J. 453 (1961).
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it considers to be a "fair" result," although, without a specific statute
on point, it is regrettable but historically true that it has failed to
articulate an effective or standard technique." It is possible, then, that
a statutorily defined conscionability test would tend to coalesce into
at least an observable device, if not an objectively ascertainable
standard, the various approaches to contractual fair dealing.
Although conscionability is an obvious objective in consumer-
credit transactions, this writer is opposed to including a conscionability
test in the Credit Code as presently conceived. Since credit per se is
only a segment of the problem facing the consumer in his acquisition
of goods and services, the statute provides only partial protection to
consumers. The entire problem must be faced in order to make
uniform legislation effective. For example, the sale of expensive stereo
equipment to a family on relief" is just as unconscionable as the sale
to an elderly widow of a $13,200 life membership in a dance studio.'
The former, arising in a credit transaction, would be subject to the
conscionability test; the latter, a cash sale, would not. To the extent
that the social problems are alike, the social control should be con-
sistent. The answer to the foregoing type of unconscionability is
appropriate fair-trade-practice or consumer-fraud legislation" and
not an indirect swipe through the medium of a statute designed to con-
trol credit.
The unfortunate fact is that most unconscionable transactions
result from the unequal bargaining power of the parties or from
consumer ignorance. It cannot and should not be the function of a
credit code to limit the sale of shoddy merchandise or to prevent loans
to indigent borrowers for the purchase of improvident luxuries. To
some degree, the requirement of accuracy in the statement of cash
prices and finance charges promotes conscionability by informing the
consumer of exactly what expense he is undertaking, and this is a legiti-
mate objective of vigorous disclosure requirements. Whether the
transaction itself should have been consummated, however, is not
57 All courts today are influenced somewhat by judicially created equitable doc-
trines. 1 Corbin, Contracts § 128 (1963) ; Note, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401, 403 (1961).
In addition, § 2-302 of the U.C.C. has been used as a statement of principle applicable
to contests outside the area of sales of goods.
58 See Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 54, at 364. It may be that unconscionable
contracts were void at common law. See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889).
59 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
80 Lawless v. Ennis, 3 Ariz. App. 451, 415 P.2d 465 (1966).
81 See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 121%, §§ 261, 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966). The
Federal Trade Commission, in a current consideration of the need for "retail credit
guidelines," lists among the abuses requiring correction a deception whereby buyers were
requested to sign "receipts" for merchandise delivered on approval. The receipts turned
out to be sales contracts. Obviously, this is not solely a credit problem. See American
Banker, Oct. 28, 1966, p. 24.
554
REMEDIES
basically an adjunct to credit regulation. Attempts to include the
issue of conscionability within the context of a consumer-credit statute
must be inadequate, and will create a fragmentized control at best.
Perhaps at this point it is appropriate to inject a personal res-
ervation regarding uniform legislation. State fair-trade-practice
legislation is particularly associated with the "imaginative" deceptions
of the moment. Such legislation is normally adaptable to changing
conditions, and can adjust with relative ease as the circumstances that
prompted the original statute vary. An unfortunate characteristic of
"uniform" legislation, however, is that it tends to "freeze" as passed,
and thereby assumes some of the static nature that is an intrinsic
problem of federal legislation. Not only are many people involved with
the typical "uniform" statute, but a change in any single state neces-
sarily leads to implications as to the meaning of the statute in other
states where there was no change." In this respect then, "uniform"
legislation is not ordinary state legislation. If any code of uncon-
scionability or unfair trade practices is considered for incorporation
into the Credit Code, this aspect of uniform legislation should be kept
in mind.
IV. CREDITORS' REMEDIES
In a consumer-credit transaction, the needs of the creditor are
basically simpler than those of the debtor: he wishes to be paid; all
else is in support of that. A debtor can receive the money, credit, or
goods that he thinks he needs and still be injured in the eyes of the law.
But if a creditor is repaid, the obligation is satisfied, and there is no
social need to ensure him a higher order of protection relative to his
debtor."
The creditor's need for legal assistance arises after the debtor has
violated the agreement. Usually this means failure to pay, although a
consumer-credit agreement normally imposes several obligations upon
the debtor, breach of any of which could be a default. These other
obligations, however, usually relate to items of collateral protection,
62 One is reminded of the current problem in correcting the deficiencies of the
U.C.C. in the area of the subordinated debt. See Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The Outer
Fringes of Article 9, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 229 (1965). Because of the difficulties men-
tioned in the text, it was impossible to find a generally acceptable amendment in New
York State.
en R is, of course, theoretically possible to deem violations, such as improper
charges, as violations by both parties, since both are privy to the transaction. This is
not sound, however, since statutory requirements exist primarily for the benefit of the
debtor. In addition, such debtor "violations" do not, in practice, create the type of
social danger against which consumer-credit regulatory legislation must protect. The
doctrine of part delicto is inapplicable where the statute exists for the benefit of one
of the parties in particular. McAllister v. Drapeau, 14 Cal. 2d 102, 92 P.2d 911 (1939) ;
3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 942, (c) (5th ed. 1941).
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and operate more as incidental rules for the transaction than as re-
quirements indispensable to its formation." Many of these obligations
are satisfied at the inception of the transaction, but thereafter the
debtor usually enjoys a freedom from examination, and violations will
rarely come to the creditor's attention unless there is a failure of pay-
ment. Although the secondary duties are quite important to a lender, it
is doubtful whether more than a handful of consumer-debt obligations
have been enforced because of contract violations other than that of
the duty to pay." Some of the creditor's more important remedies upon
debtor's breach are examined below.
A. Repossession of Collateral
The remedy of repossession of collateral is critical to the secured
creditor, and is normally the first to which he will resort once he learns
that the debtor will not pay without some coercion. In most cases
the creditor effectuates foreclosure upon the collateral, without resort
to the courts, through an agent or representative who takes physical
possession of the security. Generally, the security agreement grants
the creditor the right to "enter" the premises of the debtor for this
purpose, thereby eliminating any action in trespass."
The right to repossess property without judicial process, essen-
tially a continuation of the common-law remedy of self-help?' has not
been challenged as an appropriate creditor remedy, although some of
the procedures used to effectuate this right have met with sharp
criticism. It is submitted that the right to nonjudicial foreclosure should
remain in the form provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, which
places few restrictions upon the creditor's actions beyond that he act
"reasonably."E 8 The specific restriction on the creditor's freedom to
repossess is that it must be done without "breach of the peace,"" a
requirement which may not be waived by the debtor.'
In some states, statutes covering consumer loans or consumer
time sales limit the creditor's right to retake the collateral." There
is no evidence that these states have accorded debtors more protection
64 For example, the creditor will probably want the collateral free of adverse liens,
insured in his favor, and kept within the state.
65 The situation is somewhat different in commercial transactions, where observance
of contractual warranties is considered of greater importance.
66 Restatement (Second), Torts § 168 (1965).
67 Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A U.L.A. § 109 (1924).
68 See U.C.C. H 9-501 to -507.
U.C.C. § 9-503.
76 U.C.C. § 9-501(3). The Code provisions were derived from § 16 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act.
71 See, e.g., Maryland Retail Instalment Sales Act, Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 141(a)
(1965) ; Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 623B
(Purdon 1965).
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than states without such rules. In an excess of zeal, some states have
required methods of consumer protection that have imposed unneces-
sary and costly restrictions upon the creditor's right to collect.' A
requirement that a debtor be given notice of the creditor's intent before
collateral is actually repossessed, for example, only serves to enable
the debtor to conceal or damage it, thereby reducing the likelihood of
collection. The debtor, who has probably received numerous com-
munications from the creditor, knows that he is in default and that
default entails risk.
The only area in which some protection beyond that provided
by the U.C.C. might benefit consumers is in connection with security
interests in household furniture." It might not be inappropriate to
require some degree of creditor "warning" before such goods are to
be repossessed. These goods are not of the mobile type, such as auto-
mobiles, which can be easily hidden; nor is a homeowner as likely to
damage them as he might an automobile which he already considers the
property of the finance company. Finally, the protection a secured
party receives from the ability to repossess household goods without
judicial process is probably not as important as the avoidance of
undue humiliation and discomfort to the unfortunate family.
B. Election of Remedies
The "election-of-remedies" doctrine provides that a secured
creditor who repossesses collateral, disposes of it, and realizes less than
the balance due, is prevented from suing on the debt for recovery of
the balance. This doctrine, it is submitted, is illogical: 74 Since an
unsecured creditor may sue on the debt and collect the whole amount
owed, why should the secured creditor not be entitled to the same
relief?
Assume a seller of goods contracts to sell for $100: If the buyer
changes his mind, and the seller reasonably disposes of the goods else-
where for $85, there can be no quarrel with his right to sue for and
collect the $15 balance. If he actually sells to the original buyer for
$100 and delivers, then repossesses after no payment, and disposes
elsewhere for $85, the same action should lie. Even if a seller chooses
to sue first for the entire amount owed and is unable to collect on his
judgment, he should not be precluded from recovering the property. 75
U Note, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 66, 71 n.31 (1932).
73 There has been occasional legislation substantially prohibiting such security in-
terests. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42a-9-209 (Supp. 1965).
74 "This exclusiveness of each remedy was developed without much rational basis."
Coogan, Hogan 8: Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the U.C.C. § 8.08(1), at 17
(1963). See also 3 Williston, Sales § 579 (rev. ed. 1948).
75 See Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Handler, 249 Minn. 539, 83 N.W.2d 103
(1957).
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The U.C.C. has completely eliminated the election-of-remedies doc-
trine," and has thereby undermined arguments supporting it, e.g.,
that a conditional seller has "rescinded" the sale when he repossesses,"
or that a chattel mortgagee has taken property to which he already has
"title."" No function would be served by including the doctrine in
uniform consumer-credit legislation.
It has been suggested that in low-balance debts (perhaps under
$500), the secured creditor should look to the debtor or to the security,
but not to both. Here, again, the election doctrine places an unfair bur-
den on the creditor, since he must speculate as to whether it is more
worthwhile to repossess or to institute legal action on the debt.' If the
possibility of repossession plus suit is deemed a nuisance to the low-
balance debtor, this applies as much, if not more, to the secured
creditor who must take the affirmative action, bear the initial costs,
and suffer the risks of collection.
The argument favoring the election doctrine is illustrated by the
situation in Schwegler Bros. v. Johnson," where a buyer bought a
radio for $64, paid $11, and then defaulted; the seller repossessed the
radio, sold it for a net of about $3, and sued to recover the $50 de-
ficiency. The court was horrified that the buyer would have to pay
$61 and, after only three months, have no radio. In a spirit of rough
justice, it allowed the creditor only an additional $10." It is, of course,
true that most low-cost items, and many of higher cost, particularly
furniture, are of little value to the secured creditor as collateral, since
they have notoriously low resale value. Consequently, the buyer's
debt may not be substantially reduced after repossession and resale.'
C. Deficiency Judgments
A typical solution proposed by those concerned with this last aspect
of the election-of-remedies problem is to forbid deficiency judgments
when the original debt is below a prescribed dollar amount. Suggested
figures run anywhere between $200 and $500. This solution is reason-
able only when original debt amount is the test, not when the unpaid
76 	§ 9-501(1).
77 3 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales § 1316 (1933).
78 2 Id. § 702. See First Nat'l Bank v. Flynn, 190 Minn. 102, 250 N.W. 806 (1933).
7° See Third Nat'l Bank v. Olive, 281 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. 1955). Compare Yellow
Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Handler, supra note 75.
80 161 Misc. 451, 291 N.Y. Supp. 321 (Buffalo City Ct. 1936), rev'd by Sup. Ct.
Erie County, Jan. 11, 1937 (unreported).
81 It is unknown whether $3 was a reasonable net resale price or whether repos-
session expenses may have reduced the net recovery.
82 Actually, the only well-established market for used consumer goods where a
reasonable resale value is generally obtainable is in used automobiles and, to a lesser
degree, boats. For all other consumer commodities, the only practical value of the col-
lateral is in terms of its use by the debtor.
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balance has been reduced to that amount, since the reduction situation
may force an election of remedies in all secured transactions at some
point, regardless of the value of the collateral.
If one agrees that deficiency judgments are proper as a general
matter, the next consideration relates to the amount for which the
debtor may be held liable after repossession and resale of the collateral.
This is determined by adding (1) the amount unpaid on the obligation,
with (2) any other costs to which the creditor may be entitled by
virtue of the default and repossession, and subtracting (3) the resale
price Each element creates its own problems.
1. Normally, default charges and/or additional interest will be
imposed as a result of the debtor's default, such interest continuing to
accrue on the outstanding balance until the debt is paid. However, in
agreements containing acceleration clauses, which make the entire un-
paid debt payable upon debtor's default, problems arise when interest
has been "precomputed" and, for purposes of payment, is treated much
the same as the principal portion of the debt. 83 In such cases, the
debtor should not have to pay unearned interest or charges. That is,
any interest that has been discounted, "precomputed," or otherwise in-
cluded in the amount of the debt should be reduced at the proper time
to indicate that the debtor's obligation is no longer outstanding and
that the creditor's investment is no longer earning interest.
Precisely when the act of acceleration occurs, however, is itself
difficult to determine. If a debtor has failed to pay, and a creditor
threatens suit, has he accelerated? If the creditor sends a letter saying
that by virtue of the default, the full balance is "due," has he then'
accelerated? If he is required to rebate at this time and then earn
interest at a reduced rate thereafter on the unpaid principal balance, the
lender will be earning less for his investment than he bargained, in
addition to the fact that he is not being paid. If the collateral is sold
and the resulting deficiency against the debtor bears interest at less
than the contract rate, the same result follows.
A reasonable way to handle the acceleration problem would be:
(a) to permit the creditor to continue the obligation in its original form
if he desires, but to charge interest on installments in default at the
rate applicable to the original contract; (b) to permit the creditor,
after a debtor default lasting a few (perhaps two) months, to "recast"
the debt at that time, giving an appropriate rebate of unearned charges,
and to charge on the unpaid balance at the originally agreed rate:" (c)
83 In other words, a debtor may borrow $1,050 and execute a note for $1,200
payable in 12 installments of $100 each, containing no reference to the original loan
amount or to an interest rate.
84 This right to "recast" exists in a substantial number of small loan laws. See,
e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 288.530(7) (Baldwin 1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1321.13
(Baldwin 1964).
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to consider a deficiency after collateral resale the same as the original
debt, bearing interest as provided in the agreement; (d) to require a
cut-off time after which the obligation would bear interest at a lower
rate (possibly the state "judgment" rate), in order to protect debtors
in high-interest transactions under which an unpaid obligation subject
to, say, an effective twenty per cent rate, would reach monumental
proportions if not stopped at some time; (e) to allow, as a severe
remedy, even an unpaid judgment to bear interest at the originally
agreed rate rather than at the state judgment rate."
2. Most consumer-loan statutes, although not the typical install-
ment sales laws, prohibit the creditor from imposing charges not spe-
cifically authorized by the statute. It is generally agreed that "charges"
includes expenses of repossession, repair, resale, and others authorized
by the U.C.C." The question of whether consumer-credit legislation
should allow these costs should be decided only after determining what
original rate to permit and the nature of the public interest to be
served, because repossession expenses not recoverable from the debtor
will become additional creditor costs and will reduce net yield from
whatever basic rate is charged. The long-range effect of this would be
to diminish the breadth of the debtor community, for, in order to
operate profitably at the permitted rates, creditors will grant credit
to fewer people who are credit risks. Varying the rate of yield, it may
be noted in passing, probably does not vary the long-range profit
of the creditor, but instead has the effect of varying the class of
debtors to whom the creditor is willing to extend credit.
In sales of collateral to satisfy a small or reduced debt, a debtor
may find a disproportionate amount added to a relatively small debt
because of the creditor's expenses of foreclosure and sale. After all,
it does not necessarily cost less to repossess and resell a commodity
when $50 is owed than when the debt is $5,000, but total expenses of
$75 seem unfair in the former case. This problem is part of the reason
for advocating an election of remedies in low-balance transactions. That
solution, however, does not really meet the problem. An election forces
a creditor to gamble on the value of the collateral, and establishes no
absolutely equitable manner of giving either the creditor or the debtor
the benefit of his bargain. In situations where the expenses of resale
are deemed an undue burden to a debtor owing less than a statutorily
stipulated amount, the solution may be to eliminate those expenses from
foreclosure, rather than to require a creditor to elect remedies. In con-
trast to the situation discussed above in relation to collateral of little
85 See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5072 (Vernon 1948). Cf. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1321.14 (Baldwin 1964).
86 U.C.C. § 9-504(1). Cf. Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Blomquist, 16 Utah 2d 157,
397 P.2d 293 (1964).
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resale value, the proper time at which to apply the statutory stipulation
is the time of repossession, not the time of the original obligation.
3. Determining the "correct" resale price for repossessed col-
lateral (i.e., the "correct" value that should be given to the debtor in
reduction of his debt) is a problem that, despite its antiquity, has
always existed in a state of legal imprecision. There is no doubt that a
pledgee or other secured party must deal fairly with collateral so as
to give the debtor that to which he is entitled." Beyond this, there are
few settled principles. 88
In an action for recovery of the deficiency, the court will gen-
erally direct its consideration toward the method of resale rather than
to the price obtained." Where the method utilized was appropriate, and
followed statutory prescriptions, there has been comparatively little
independent judicial examination of the liquidation price obtained to
reduce the debtor's ultimate liability." However, if collusion or other
acts in violation of the creditor's general duty of trust are present, the
resale may be nullified." A court may consider a grossly inadequate
price, although price is not directly in issue, as evidence that a proper
resale did not in fact occur."
The foreclosure and liquidation of collateral is, however, subject
to the general control of a court of equity." Where statutes do not
specify a method of resale, a "public" sale or auction, at which dis-
interested parties bid for the collateral, is usually an acceptable mode
of disposition. While a court will not attempt its own valuation of
the collateral when there has been a public sale," it may do so when the
sale is "private.' In the latter case, the sale is simply a disposition by
the secured party to one buyer or a very restricted group of buyers,
and there is no compelling reason to believe that a fair price was ob-
tained. The courts may, in such circumstances, examine the price to
ascertain whether the debtor has received fair value."
The U.C.C. requires only that a resale, either public or private, be
87 Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 131, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966) ;
Matter of Kiamie, 309 N.Y. 325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955) ; Restatement, Security § 49
(1941).
88 But see U.C.C. § 9-207.
89 See Strahan v. Atlanta Nat'l Bank, 206 Ark. 522, 176 S.W.2d 236 (1943).
90 See Island Factors Co. v. Lance Cleaners, Inc., 25 Misc. 2d 365, 202 N.Y.S.2d
828 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
91 Hanan v. Threadgill, 296 Fed. 569 (SD. Fla. 1924).
92 Fleischmann v. Clausen, 222 App. Div. 7, 225 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1927). In this
case, property was sold at a foreclosure sale for $8,000 and subsequently resold by the
buyer for $16,500. Here, the inadequate price obtained by the repossessor was an element
of bad faith. As far as possible he must try toobtain the fair market value.
93 See McClintock, Equity § 35 (2d ed. 1948).
Strahan v. Atlanta Nat'l Bank, supra note 89.
95 Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., 126 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
96 Cf. 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 839 (1937).
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"commercially reasonable." 97 If confronted with a "reasonable" method
of sale, the court has no formal power under the U.C.C. to reexamine
the price independently, and is forced to allow the debtor only the actual
price received at the sale. In determining whether the sale was "com-
mercially reasonable," however, the court may consider the adequacy
of the price as one factor."
The equitable tests of the U.C.C. are sufficient to give debtors
proper value upon liquidation of collateral. No absolute rule need be
made as to what that value is, and the existing judicial emphasis on
methods of foreclosure, rather than price derived therefrom, appears to
be correct. As business conditions and markets change, so will the
considerations of what is "commercially reasonable." More specific
standards in the Credit Code would be neither wise nor useful to pro-
tect the consumer in this regard.
D. Wage Assignments and Garnishment
1. Some General Comments. A wage assignment is a voluntary
act by a debtor assigning to a creditor all or a portion of his future
wages for payment of an obligation. Normally, the employer does not
make payments directly to the creditor until he is notified that the
debtor, his employee, has defaulted. Thus, the wage assignment "se-
cures" the debt— it is not the source of primary payment. A garnish-
ment is a judicial proceeding which enables a creditor to reach the
debtor's wages after default, usually to enforce a judgment. The funda-
mental effect of the two devices is substantially the same—payment
of the debtor's wages by his employer directly to a creditor."
The existing pattern of laws covering wage assignments and garnish-
ment varies enormously from state to state. These procedures are
typically regulated by civil-practice laws, small loan laws, retail in-
stallment sales laws, and independent statutes governing one or both
of the devices specifically. Since no two states have identical statutes,
the safest course in drafting uniform legislation is either to say very
little on the subjects or to treat them fully.
States differ as to whether consumer debts may support an assign-
ment or garnishment. Although most consumer-loan laws authorize
wage assignments as security,'" most consumer installment sales laws
forbid them, the policy being that the creditor should secure himself
97 See U.C.C. II 9-501 to -507. The unregulated system of repossession and re-
sale of the U.C.C. differs markedly from the detailed structure of such statutes as the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
98 See Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 124 (Callaghan
1965).
99 City & Suburban Homes Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 39 Misc. 2d 299, 240
N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963).
100 See Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation 41 & n.239 (1965).
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with the goods sold and not have easy and immediate access directly
to his debtor's wages. On the other hand, there does not appear to be
any legislation preventing a creditor from garnishing the debtor's
wages if default under the installment sale is followed by suit and
judgment. The fundamental difference between the two procedures is
that the wage assignment, a voluntary, contractual arrangement, is
initiated with the agreement, while the garnishment is instituted by
operation of law. Inequities or undue coercion inherent in gaining
access to the debtor's wages will, to some degree, be reduced due to
judicial presence. The author is not sure whether this justifies major
differences in the remedies.
Similarly, why should differences exist in the amount of wages
exempt from assignment and the amount exempt from garnishment?
Here, where the only question is how much the debtor needs in order
to live—a more important consideration than the payment of his
creditors—similar treatment of garnishment and assignment seems
correct. Since the court is present in the former, however, flexible
treatment might be possible. The court could vary the statutory stan-
dard when a debtor requires more, or less, to live than the statutory
exemptions allow. One proposal, rejected by the New York Legis-
lature,'°' embodied a flexible garnishment and wage assignment ap-
proach based upon minimum-wage indices. While not the only possi-
bility, it is certainly a viable alternative. Another approach is to give
the courts latitude to vary a basic exemption in individual cases.'"
There is, however, much to be said for making exemptions alike in wage
assignments and garnishments.
Undoubtedly, the social movement is toward reduction in the
use of wage assignments and, to a lesser degree, garnishments. While
statistics are scarce and inconclusive, it does appear that both devices
do more harm than good. 103 Evidence indicates that consumer bank-
ruptcies are higher in those jurisdictions where wage-assignment or
garnishment laws are liberal toward the creditor.'" In installment
selling, where wage assignments are not generally used, there is no
evidence that collections have been hampered as a result. Further-
101 N.Y. Assembly Print 6952, Intro. 5983 (1966).
102 See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 48a(2) (a) (McKinney 1962), which establishes
a fixed test; N.Y. Civ. Prat. Law § 793 (McKinney 1963) (since repealed), which
authorized judicial flexibility.
103 A debtor's employer may become involved in the defaulting employee's per-
sonal economic difficulties, of ten causing job tensions, if not dismissal. In addition, the
employer will be greatly inconvenienced if he has to adjust his bookkeeping or his IBM
check-processing machine, and these adjustments may be costly.
104 See Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,
53 Calif. L. Rev. 1212, 1236 (1965).
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more, the growth of installment selling hardly seems to have been
stunted.
2. Assignment of Wages. Only long usage can really justify
allowing a wage assignment as security for a loan of money while pro-
hibiting it for a deferred-payment sales obligation. 105 It is not in-
conceivable, moreover, that a total elimination of wage assignments
would increase rather than reduce the total number of collections by
curtailing employee dismissals and bankruptcies.
Where it is deemed proper to retain the wage assignment, con-
siderable debtor protections should always exist. One must, for ex-
ample, establish the proper level of wages to exempt; and the assign-
ment should be effective only in the event of employee default.' There
is no reason why a wage earner should be annoyed or embarrassed in
his employment relationship while he is honoring his obligations. In
addition, a clear system of priorities among competing assignees of
wages,'" perhaps based upon a filing system, would not only avoid
unnecessary conflict, but reduce the tendency of secondary assignees
to contact employers.
3. Garnishment. The problems of garnishment, not only in
consumer-credit transactions, but as a judicial remedy in general, have
wide implications which a uniform consumer-credit code must con-
sider—especially to prevent changes in other areas of the law where
change may not be intended.
A garnishment has judicial force behind it and is, therefore, a
somewhat more potent remedy than the assignment of wages. Its use,
therefore, should be restricted to situations where a judgment on the
debt has been obtained. While this is the prevailing pattern, some states
permit a formal garnishment upon initiation of the lawsuit.m.
Legislative control over employee discharges because of wage
garnishment is another issue the draftsmen of the Credit Code should
consider. There are two primary alternatives: (1) The draftsmen may
choose to ignore the problem entirely. In view of the fact that garnish-
ment is a legal remedy affecting much more than consumer credit, this
would not be an unreasonable choice. (2) They may decide to forbid
employee dismissals because of garnishment."'
105 Where a loan is made to enable the borrower to make a purchase, there is
clearly no valid distinction in so far as security is concerned.
106 The New York law prescribes time periods and other procedures after default
before the wage assignment may be enforced. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 48 (McKinney
1962).
107 See, e.g., County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cummings, 42 Misc. 2d 949, 249
N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
108 E.g., Ala. Code tit. 7, §§ 314, 995, 996 (1958) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-1521,
-1571 (1952) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 77.18, .19 (1965).
109 New York recently adopted this approach. N.Y. Laws 1966, ch. 613.
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It is uncertain what effects, if any, would flow from implementa-
tion of the second alternative. Difficult issues of proof, such as
whether the dismissal resulted because of the garnishment or for other
reasons, may arise. Legal techniques based upon such traditional con-
cepts as proximate cause, materiality, and the like would seem, how-
ever, sufficient to deal with this. Perhaps a more basic issue is whether
the state should forbid an employer to dismiss an employee because
of a wage garnishment. Although unpaid debts resulting in judgments
are a man's personal problems, they may affect his desirability as an
employee. Similarly, the expense and nuisance of garnishment can
create employer costs that are not a normal part of the employment
bargain.
New York has made a policy choice that the problems of garnish-
ment are assumed by the employer.'" An employee may be dismissed
because he is discovered to have exorbitant debts, because he is in
default, or because he is sued, but not because his income is garnished.
The New York position is clearly defensible based upon the social need
for consumer protection. It would be more equitable to the employer,
however, if the procedures for enforcing the garnishment were made
simpler. Proposals for simplified wage-earner receivership at the
state level represent a step in this direction.
V. CONCLUSION
Consumer credit is an issue of increasing national concern.'
Although there seems to be little question that something must be
done to remedy abuses, there is practically no consensus on what those
abuses are. Attention revolves generally around the problems of the
poor. Those problems obviously go much deeper than types and costs
of credit, and, therefore, the ultimate contribution of the Credit Code,
which treats only these external areas, will probably be minor at best.
Unfortunately, ignorance exists at all levels of the problem. The
potential debtor is uninformed as to the various sources of credit and
as to the methods of obtaining maximum credit benefits. The legislator
is uninformed on the needs of the credit industry. Neutral parties in
government and the universities are only gradually developing an
expertise as consumer problems become both more pressing and more
respectable as a field of investigation. Law school courses are slowly
introducing consumer problems as such; law reviews are recognizing
consumer law as a research area; 112 the President's Committee on Con-
sumer Interests is uncovering interesting and stimulating material;
110 See ibid.
111 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1967, p. 1, col. 8.
112 See also Symposium—Consumer Protection, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1197 (1966).
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the Council on Consumer Information, based at the University of
Missouri, has also published valuable consumer-credit information.
Probably most significant is the study of consumer-credit counsel-
ing agencies now being conducted by the Family Service Association." 3
It is envisaged that a widespread network of such agencies will ulti-
mately be available on a nonprofit basis to inform and advise the
consumer in his credit problems. Both consumer and responsible
creditor groups are wholeheartedly—and financially—behind the for-
mation of such agencies. More intelligent use of credit can only benefit
both groups. Present plans are for the Credit Code to provide a
framework within which such agencies can act as an integral part of
its regulation of consumer credit.
This writer believes that the problems of consumer credit can
only be resolved through the combination of effective legislation and
informed consumers. The former is already much better than many
critics would have us believe, but the latter is still almost entirely
unattained. Consumers need a true understanding of the basics of
credit and not merely the antiseptic disclosures given or proposed to
be given in consumer-debt agreements. It may, in fact, be that the
lengthy covenants of the consumer contract cause more confusion
than enlightenment and, after numerous disclosures are made, the
terms of the deal might merely be a reference to a statute or a "master"
contract on file with a supervisory agency. Certainly, such isolation of
the basic elements of the transaction would emphasize to the uninitiated
what really are the most important portions of his obligation.
Studies have barely scratched the surface of the law of remedies,
as applied particularly to consumer-credit problems. What has passed
for learning has more often been generalization drawn from limited
experience. It is hoped that studies, such as that of the Family Service
Association, will lead to a true understanding of where remedies are
being abused and where remedies can be provided, in a manner that
will serve the ultimate ends of consumer credit.
Meanwhile, remedies are undoubtedly a neglected stepchild of
the Credit Code. The issues raised in this article are only some of the
obstacles that must be passed in developing a cohesive legal system of
remedies."' The issues are difficult, and one regrets the present signs
that the Credit Code will be less than satisfactory in resolving them.
Progress is, however, often slow, and one may find encouragement in
what will be one more forward step toward the needed resolution.
113 See Hall, Developments in the Study of Family Credit Counseling Being Con-
ducted by Family Service Association, 20 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 122 (1966).
114 The issues of bankruptcy and the related issues of state insolvency laws, both
of which are vital in dealing with the problem, have been largely ignored in this article.
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